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Trianon and its aftermath: British geography and the ‘dismemberment’ of Hungary, c.1915–c.1922

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ABSTRACT

In the wake of World War I, geographers helped advise national delegations at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference whose purpose was to delimit Europe’s new boundaries. The paper examines the role played by British geographers, specifically Alan Ogilvie and the British geographical delegation, in the Treaty of Trianon (1920) which greatly reduced Hungary’s territorial extent. Attention is paid to contemporary published work on the new Europe, particularly Marion Newbigin’s \textit{Aftermath: A Geographical Study of the Peace Terms} and Ogilvie’s \textit{Boundary Settlement} (1922). Assessment of manuscript diaries and correspondence reveals the complex circumstances faced by geographers engaged in peace work. The work of different practitioners – in the Royal Geographical Society (RGS), over how national boundaries should be arrived at (on either ethnic or physiographic grounds) – was hindered by inadequate map provision from British geographical institutions. This led Ogilvie to propose a new geographical body for Britain at a time when the RGS was facing criticism and when the meetings of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, not the RGS, provided the forum for discussion of the new post-war Europe.

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Introduction

None of the Peace Treaties was more drastic in its terms than the Treaty of Trianon. By it Hungary was not so much mutilated as dismembered. (Macartney, 1937, p. 1)

Following World War I, politicians from combatant nations faced the challenge of rewriting Europe’s national borders. Geographical representatives who acted as members of or advisors to different national delegations helped delimit the new boundaries that followed the peace treaties. American, British, and continental European geographers’ participation in World War II has been the subject of analysis (Ackerman, 1945; Balchin, 1987; Clayton & Barnes, 2015; Maddrell, 2008). Almost no work has examined the role played by British geographers in WWI.
Heffernan (1996) is an important exception. Even before 1914, notes Heffernan, the Royal Geographical Society (RGS) was involved with the Ordnance Survey (OS) and the Geographical Section of the General Staff (GSGS) in coordinating geographical facts for use in military strategy, in boundary mapping, and in collaborating on the 1:1 million map project initiated in 1891 by German geomorphologist Albrecht Penck. As early as mid-1914, the RGS became, in effect, ‘a technical and cartographic annex to the War Office’ (Heffernan, 1996, p. 509). Individuals involved in this respect included imperial surveyor Colonel Sir Thomas Holdich, Colonel (later Sir) Walter Coote Hedley of the GSGS, and astronomer Arthur Hinks, who, from 1915, combined the roles of RGS secretary and editor of the society’s Geographical Journal. From 1914, these individuals and institutions were principally concerned with the 1:1 million mapping of the Near East and North Africa. From 1916, their attention focused on mapping and military strategy on Europe’s western front. At the end of the war, British geographical representation in Paris for the peace negotiations comprised a small GSGS party, led by Hedley ‘and including Major O E Wynne and Captain Alan G Ogilvie, who offered cartographic advice to the British delegation’ (Heffernan, 1996, p. 520). The British geographical delegation was neither as large nor as influential as that of other nations’. For Heffernan, ‘The failure of British geographers to play a significant role in the Peace Conference possibly relates to the largely amateur nature of the discipline in the UK at the time’ (Heffernan, 1996, p. 521).

This paper, like that of Heffernan (1996), is a foray into ‘the dialectic between geography and war in the period from 1914 to 1919’ (Heffernan, 1996, p. 505). Unlike Heffernan, whose focus was British geography and geographers at work in WWI, our concern is with the role of British geography and geographers in negotiating the peace that followed the conflict and with their reactions to a specific treaty, the Treaty of Trianon of 4 June 1920, that re-drew the boundaries of one combatant nation, Hungary.

The facts of Trianon are well known. In a document of 364 articles in 14 parts, Hungary ceded approximately two-thirds of its territory, and 60% of its population (from 18.2 million to 7.9 million) to six different neighbouring states (Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Italy). Hungary’s territorial losses far exceeded those of Germany, commonly considered the primary defeated nation. Hungary’s ‘dismemberment’ at Trianon – a term used widely to describe the event – was of enormous concern to contemporaries and has defined Hungary since: ‘the catastrophe that befell Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference was the most decisive moment in modern Hungarian history, the repercussions of which continue to be felt even today’ (Caples, 2005, p. 52). If the facts of Trianon are understood, British geography’s involvement in the treaty and in its aftermath is not.

The purpose of this paper is to examine British involvement in the Paris negotiations, Trianon’s aftermath, and the reaction, chiefly of British but also of Hungarian geographers, in print and in speech, to Hungary’s dismemberment. To do so, we trace the activities of British geographers concerning Hungary, mapping and war before as well as after Trianon. The paper makes use of private diaries, unpublished correspondence, and published work, in English and in Hungarian, to explore the role of the key individuals and institutions involved, notably the RGS and the British Association for the Advancement of Science (BAAS). Principal among the individuals involved was Alan Ogilvie, one of Britain’s geographical representatives in Paris, and, from 1923, lecturer, reader, and
(from 1931) professor in geography at the University of Edinburgh. Others include Marion Newbigin, editor of the *Scottish Geographical Magazine*, and John McFarlane, author (amongst other works) of a text on economic geography (McFarlane, 1914). McFarlane, a historian by training, was from 1903 lecturer in geography at the University of Manchester before, in 1919, he took up the first lectureship in geography at the University of Aberdeen. During WWI, he was involved with Hinks and other British geographers, including Henry N. Dickson and R. N. Rudmose Brown, in preparing naval and military handbooks for use in the conflict (Kain & Delano-Smith, 2003, pp. 388–389; Naval Intelligence Department, 1919). Ogilvie filled McFarlane’s Manchester post between August 1919 and May 1920. In June 1920, Ogilvie departed for the American Geographical Society (AGS) in New York to work on the 1:1 million map project alongside Isaiah Bowman – who led the American geographical group in Paris.

The first part of the paper provides necessary context to our later detailed analysis. We document the work of the geographical delegations in Paris, the involvement of the Hungarian delegation in the Treaty of Trianon and discuss the appeals made, by Hungarian geographers and others, for ‘Justice for Hungary’. In the second part, we begin our analysis of British geographers’ involvement with Trianon and its aftermath by examining the two principal printed works on the question, Marion Newbigin’s *Aftermath: A Geographical Study of the Peace Terms* (1920), and Alan Ogilvie’s *Some Aspects of Boundary Settlement at the Peace Conference* (1922). At 128 pages, Newbigin’s *Aftermath* is the largest single work by a contemporary British geographer into the immediate circumstances of Europe post-WWI, a fact that makes its omission by later scholars puzzling (none of Dhand (2018), Smith (2003) or Seegel (2018) mention it or her). Ogilvie’s shorter 1922 *Boundary Settlement* has also been ignored despite his central involvement, in Paris and among Britain’s geographers, in the work of boundary delimitation.

In the third part, we discuss British geographers’ interests in Hungary before Trianon. We examine the activities of the British delegation in Paris with specific reference to Ogilvie’s work, his prior experience of boundary mapping and his work with Cambridge historian Harold Temperley, a member of the British delegation, who produced a definitive account of the Paris Conference (Temperley, 1920) and who invited Ogilvie to prepare his 1922 book. Ogilvie’s proposal, never realised, for a new British geographical organisation in this context was, we suggest, affirmation of the muddled state of British geography, in map work and in its relationship with British government departments, and of competing ideas as to how boundary mapping should be undertaken. In the final part, we return to spoken papers and published work by Newbigin, McFarlane and others to show why section E of the BAAS, and not the RGS, provided the setting for British geographers’ engagement with Trianon and Hungary after 1920.

This narrative structure warrants explanation. To begin with the principal published works which appear at the end of the period in question is not to flout the ‘rules’ of chronological order in historical narrative. Our concern is to document what British geographers said and wrote about the geographical consequences of Trianon in relation to WWI and the new Europe. To do this and to understand not just what was said and when but how, why, and by whom requires that we get ‘behind and beneath’ published accounts and illuminate the complex circumstances involved: in earlier years, in different institutional settings, in private correspondence and public utterances as well as in print. Rather, then, than work forwards to what might be taken as the printed
apotheoses of British geographical interests in the new Europe immediately after WWI, we work back and forth between c.1915 and c.1922 and between published work and manuscript evidence in order to illuminate the connections between geographers’ work and geographers’ lives.

**Geographers in Paris: the Peace Conference, Trianon, and ‘justice for Hungary’**

The Paris Peace Conference began on 1 January 1919: it and its ramifications have been widely studied (for a summary, see Macmillan, 2001; Sharp, 2015; for a detailed history, see Temperley, 1920; for a comprehensive history of the Trianon Treaty, see Romsics, 2002). Others have described the role played by geographers advising these delegations, notably Isaiah Bowman and his colleagues on behalf of the United States (Reisser, 2012; Martin, 2015, pp. 52, 640; Smith, 2003, pp. 139–180), and, less fully, of Eugeniusz Romer and Jovan Cvijić for east central Europe (Ginsburger, 2016; Konopska, 2016; Labbé, 2018; Seegel, 2018, pp. 44–47, 58). Several studies have been published on the role of Hungarian geographers by Hungarian authors (Hajdú, 2000; Krasznai, 2012; Segyevy, 2016), chief among them Ablonczy’s biographical monograph on Pál Teleki (Ablonczy, 2007). Documenting the delegations’ work at length is not our concern, except where it is relevant for Ogilvie and Briain’s geographical contingent. Some background facts are important nevertheless.

**Geographers working for peace**

Geographers were involved in delegations from the victorious nations, including Britain, France, and the United States, and from those ‘emergent’ nations whose territorial delimitation was among the subjects for discussion. The French delegation took its geographical information from representatives of the Geographical Section of the French Foreign Office; the Service Géographique de l’Armée; and the Service Géographique Français, drawn from the Société de Géographie de Paris, which included geographers Emmanuel de Martonne, Emmanuel de Margerie, Albert Demangeon, Lucien Gallois, and Jean Brunhes. France’s geographical representatives helped wield ‘real influence on French policies at the Peace Conference’ (Heffernan, 1996, p. 520; see also Heffernan, 1995).

The American peace delegation was a large-scale affair (over 150 academics, 1,248 persons in all: Smith, 2003, p. 145). Nominally under the direction of Colonel Edward Mandell House, appointed to the position by US President Woodrow Wilson, it was managed by Isaiah Bowman, director of the AGS in whose New York offices the House Inquiry was housed. Bowman, the ‘chief territorial specialist to the American delegation’ (Smith, 2003, p. 143), was one of four geographers advising the Americans. The others were Douglas Johnson from Columbia University, Mark Jefferson from Michigan State Normal School, and, briefly, Lawrence Martin of the University of Wisconsin. Jefferson headed the division on ‘geography and cartography’, Johnson that of ‘boundary topography’. The work of human geographer Jovan Cvijić from the University of Belgrade on mapping ethnic boundaries helped unite the Serbs, Croatians, and Slovenians into what became Yugoslavia (Ginsburger, 2016). Cartographer and political geographer Eugeniusz Romer acted similarly in advising the Polish delegation (Konopska, 2016; Labbé, 2018;
The three-man British ‘geographical section’ – Hedley, Wynne, and, until June 1919, Ogilvie – ‘was able to furnish the delegation and the Congress in general with an ample supply of maps, in which it had the help of a cartographic section R. E. [Royal Engineers] with printing equipment commanded by Major W. Stanford’ (Anon., 1920, p. 312: although unattributed, the author was Hinks).

Many of the geographers engaged in peace work in Paris knew one another. They did so because they had participated in the 1912 Transcontinental Excursion of the United States under the direction of geomorphologist William Morris Davis. This is the case for Bowman, Johnson and Jefferson from the United States, for Demangeon, Gallois, de Martonne, and de Margerie from France, and Ogilvie from Britain. Two leading Hungarian geographers who headed the Hungarian peace preparation work, Pál Teleki (who was among the Hungarian negotiators in Paris in 1920) and Jenő Cholnoky (who was the head of the Peace Preparation Office in Budapest while Teleki was in Paris), also took part in the Excursion. Cholnoky published his recollections of the excursion decades later (Cholnoky, 1942). The work in Paris within and between national delegations thus drew upon prior social relationships sustained by shared experiences of an eight-week 14,000-mile geographical fieldtrip (Clout, 2005; Maclean, 2011). For Ogilvie and Johnston in particular, proximity in Paris strengthened these personal connections. The British delegation billeted in the Hôtel Majestic, the Americans’ in the Hôtel de Crillon. Ogilvie, Johnson, and others socialised together: making peace was several times the subject of dinner table conversation.

The work of these geographers involved preparing and drawing maps, and in advising delegations upon the placement of boundaries and upon the possible consequences. The work of mapping was principally based on ethnic distribution determined by language use, not physiography or other ‘natural’ features (an emphasis which would prove awkward for some British geographers). On a continental scale, the focus upon ‘the cartography of ethnicity’ (Smith, 2003, p. 174) summarily changed the identities of tens of millions of people in Europe and, in doing so, helped sow the seeds of later greater conflict (Seegel, 2018; Smith, 2003). Locally, delegates’ recognition of the epistemic value of maps depended upon networks of individual contact and information exchange: among individual geographers advising different national delegations, and between individual geographers in Paris and their host geographical societies. For Ogilvie, these networks were also personal, involving his wife Evelyn (like Ogilvie an Oxford-educated geographer), who received official clearance from Military Intelligence (MI4) in GSGS and who acted as an unpaid research assistant, liaising between Hinks, Holdich, and others in the RGS, and her husband in Paris.

These issues – of socio-intellectual context before 1919 and in Paris, particular spaces affording Conference participants a means to extend such contact, and emphasis upon mapping ethnicity – applied to the Hungarian delegation, but in different ways. The Hungarian delegation, led by Count Albert Apponyi and including Teleki, had no role in the peace negotiations until 1 December 1919 (formally, they accepted the invitation to take part on 3 December) and, effectively, no official involvement until late January 1920 by which time Hungary’s new borders under Trianon had been drawn up. It is worth noting, however, that Teleki and the Hungarian politicians were realistic about the imminent territorial losses even before the peace talks had started, as is evident from the letter Teleki sent to Bowman (Teleki, 1918, December 25). The first ‘concrete and recorded plan
for the new frontiers of Hungary came in a report of January 1919 prepared by the division chiefs of the Intelligence Section of the American delegation, to which section Isaiah Bowman was executive officer (Deák, 1942, p. 27). In later informing diplomatic historian Francis Deák about working procedures, Bowman provides a glimpse into what was involved. Memoranda on particular topics ‘were reduced to brief and undocumented recommendations.’ These, upon further review, ‘were assembled, illustrated with maps, and brought together in what was called the “Black Book”’ (Deák, 1942, p. 27). This ‘Black Book’ – so-called because of its binding – was the United States’ (in effect, Bowman’s) proposals for the new Europe (Reisser, 2012; Smith, 2003, pp. 147–149). Base maps had been prepared by staff in the AGS before arrival in Paris (Anon., 1919: although unattributed, the author was Bowman). Map making and boundary delimitation was central to the geographers’ work because contemporaries saw maps as political instruments – ‘powerful tools toward specific, often highly political purposes’ (Smith, 2003, p. 147).

**Justice for Hungary: revisionism and the reaction of Hungary’s geographers**

It is helpful to distinguish between politicians’ reaction to Trianon, that of the Hungarian public, and the reaction of Hungary’s geographers, related though these topics are. Hungary was unstable politically following defeat in WWI. A Hungarian Peoples’ Republic operated between November 1918 and March 1919. This was followed by a short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic (March–August 1919), which was suppressed with the help of the Romanian army. The Kingdom of Hungary was restored in March 1920: Admiral Horthy was elected ‘Regent’ because the return of the Habsburgs to the Hungarian throne was banned by the Allies. Shared views over Hungary’s ‘dismemberment’, and appeals to a new ‘Mitteleuropa’ of small nations, with a reduced Hungary as part, were not aided by what Apponyi tersely described as ‘two revolutions, four months of the ragings of Bolshevism and several months of the Roumanian occupation’ (Deák, 1942, p. 546; Dhand, 2018, pp. 133–134, 141–143; Pastor, 2003).

In the public sphere, newspapers and popular iconography displayed common themes: dismay, lament at the destruction of a one-thousand-year old kingdom, appeals to international intervention (Peterecz, 2017). Popular cartography was used to justify revisionist claims (Keményfi, 2010). As part of an appeal in English for ‘Justice for Hungary’, one Hungarian newspaper published maps which showed the loss of Hungarian territory and, comparatively, the effect upon Great Britain had Trianon been applied there (Figure 1). The ‘Justice for Hungary’ campaign intensified in the late 1920s after Hungary had secured the support of Italy in 1927. The journal *Magyar Szemle* was the primary public forum for discussion of what became the two principal issues: revision of Trianon and a developing Hungarian irredentism, and concern over the situation of ethnic Hungarians resident in adjoining states (Caples, 2005). The range of the goals of territorial revision ran from the minimal (the re-annexation of territory with indisputably Hungarian populations that lay outside the country’s new borders) to an integral revisionism (with the motto: ‘Everything Back!’). (For a detailed analysis of the ideas on revisionism, see Zeidler, 2007, pp. 65–79.)

Hungary’s geographical representatives thus arrived at the Peace Conference in particular circumstances: late, to join in proceedings whose proposals were already accepted and for which map boundaries were prepared, at least in draft, without the capacity to effect
change, and as members of a nation large parts of whose geography had been summarily removed. Once there, they found that others did not view the Hungarian question as significant. Hungarians had long been seen as elite within Austro-Hungary: attitudes in Paris reflected views of them as cultural oppressors. Where delegates from the victorious nations

were certainly war weary, they were by the time of Trianon also tired of peace making. Settlement with the Germans (the Treaty of Versailles) was for many the principal objective. This treaty played no part in the negotiations with Hungary. Together with long-running views on Magyar hegemony toward other ethnicities, it did, however, have ‘a decided bearing on the psychology of some of the Allied participants in the Peace Conference, who were primarily interested in Germany and who, after the peace with her had been made, exhibited only a perfunctory interest in the other peace treaties’ (Deák, 1942, p. 181). For others, Trianon was hurried through because it was late in the negotiations overall, ‘at a time when the peacemakers were anxious to bring the entire process to a swift conclusion’ (Caples, 2005, p. 55): ‘what ultimately told against Hungary was sheer inertia’ (Macmillan, 2001, p. 277).

The Hungarians impressed nevertheless. For Deák, ‘the capacity shown by the Hungarians at the Peace Conference to support their contentions with voluminous material of no mean scientific value and a fair amount of accuracy was indeed remarkable. This accomplishment says much for the quality of the men who composed the Hungarian Peace Delegation and indicates a self-sacrificing willingness to work and cooperate in the effort to salvage everything possible from the shambles left in the wake of war, revolution, and enemy occupation’ (Deák, 1942, p. 177). Apponyi’s statement, in which he voiced Hungarians’ ‘astonishment at the extreme severity of the conditions of peace’, was a tour de force (Deák, 1942, p. 540; Macmillan, 2001, p. 277). Teleki was praised: ‘His knowledge of geography, geopolitics, demography, and history was largely the foundation on which the work of the [Hungarian] Peace Delegation was based’ (Deák, 1942, pp. 178–179).

Although Deák cannot be called an impartial historian of the negotiations – he worked as legal advisor to the Hungarian delegation at the assemblies of the League of Nations in the 1930s (Reeves, 2011, pp. 23–27) – the impact of the Hungarian argument is unquestionable. The Italian Prime Minister, Francesco Nitti, was genuinely moved by Apponyi’s speech, and even the reaction of Lloyd George seemed encouraging (Romsics, 2002, pp. 127–128).

Hungary’s geographers turned to map making, to publications urging Trianon’s revision, and appeals to the international geographical community. The key representatives of the Hungarian Geographical Society were confident about the positive outcome of the war and the successful accomplishment of their goals even as late as spring of 1918, but they feverishly switched to a new mode a few months later in order to produce arguments in defence of their national boundaries. The peace preparation work was initiated by the secretary general of the society, Pál Teleki, and, in collaboration with the Hungarian Central Statistical Office and the government, the Hungarian Geographical Society embarked on the mapping of statistical data. The ethnographical maps were of the utmost importance and several were produced even as the Austro-Hungarian Empire began to crumble (Hajdú, 2000). The board of the society chose Károly Kogutowicz’s proposal from among four candidates in October 1918 (each map proposed different methods to illustrate the ethnic composition of Hungary), and his detailed and accurate 1:200,000 map was printed first (Segyey, 2016).

Meanwhile, Teleki Pál – suffering from influenza and bedridden for three weeks in November–December 1918 – planned a more suggestive map which conveyed the Hungarian point of view far better (Benda, 2017). Combining data on language use with population density, Teleki’s map was presented to the Hungarian Geographical Society in
January 1919, with Teleki suggesting that the society issue a manifesto to defend the integrity of the country (Ablonczy, 2007). Taking less than six weeks to prepare (Benda, 2017), Teleki’s iconic ‘Carte Rouge’, so-called because it depicted the distribution of the Hungarian population in bright red, and properly titled (in English) *The Ethnographical Map of Hungary According to Population Density* (Figure 2), circulated in Hungarian academic geography and beyond. Issued in different European languages, Teleki’s ‘Carte Rouge’ became a symbol of Hungary’s ethnic identity and territorial integrity, under threat from neighbouring states and other ethnic groups (Seegel, 2018, pp. 64–66). Apponyi unfolded a copy during his speech in January 1920 (Macmillan, 2001, p. 277). The map, or variants and later editions, appeared within publications by Teleki and other Hungarian geographers (for example, Anon., 1920–1922; Fodor, 1920a, 1920b, 1928; Teleki, 1919a, 1919b, 1923).

The Hungarian peace preparation work was interrupted by the revolutions in Budapest, and the Office for Peace Preparations was officially set up only in August 1919. The newly-founded institution eventually became a department of the Foreign Ministry headed by Teleki, with Cholnoky as his deputy (Zeidler, 2017). Organizing the Office’s work proved difficult given conditions in Hungary in the wake of the country’s collapse. Cholnoky had been appointed as professor of geography at the University of Kolozsvár (today: Cluj, Romania) in 1905 and taught there during the war. Kolozsvár was occupied by the Romanian army at Christmas 1918, and Cholnoky had to flee the city after being briefly imprisoned in the autumn of 1919 (Cholnoky, 1998). Almost the same happened to Ferenc Fodor, the other geographer and cartographer recruited to work in the Office. Fodor and

![Figure 2. Pal Teleki, Ethnographical Map of Hungary based on density of population; Magyarország néprajzi térképe a népsűrűség alapján; Carte ethnographique de la Hongrie construite en accord avec la densité [sic] de la population (Budapest, 1919).](image-url)
his wife were suspended from secondary school teaching in the occupied town of Karánsebes (today: Caransebeș, Romania), and, after leaving most of their possessions behind, they managed to cross the demarcation lines, with Fodor arriving in Budapest in October 1919 (Fodor, 2016).

Even before their involvement in Paris, and eighteen months before Trianon, Teleki was urging Cholnoky to enlist others’ support ‘concerning the open questions of the future of our country’. He proposed that ‘the old man’ – [Hungarian geographer Lajos Lóczy] should travel to Britain ‘for he is on good terms with Scott Keltie and with others’. They planned correspondence with others: ‘Whose side do you think de Martonne will take? Shall we write to him?’ [As we show below, he favoured the Romanians]. As Teleki put it, ‘It would be very good if you summarized and then stressed in precise detail the following problem, namely that a country that has been deprived of all its iron, coal, timber, and precious minerals is very likely to become the hotbed of a new economic war. Moreover, given the loss of 4 million ethnic Hungarians, it is likely to give rise to a new irredentism’ (Teleki, 1918, November 6). Teleki wrote to Isaiah Bowman, his letter employing the same argument that he had suggested to Cholnoky two weeks earlier (Teleki, 1918, December 25). Personal connections between Lajos Lóczy and John Scott Keltie in the RGS to which Teleki appealed echoed those between Teleki, Cholnoky, and George Goudie Chisholm, lecturer in geography at the University of Edinburgh and a participant on the 1912 Transcontinental Excursion. Chisholm makes no direct mention of Trianon in his diaries, but preparatory notes on his teaching in this period show an awareness of the implications of ‘the Peace at Versailles’ and the decline of ‘Austro-Hungarian resources after the War’ (Chisholm, n.d., University of Edinburgh Collections, Chisholm, G., ca. December 1919, Gen. 1060/79, f. 227).

Teleki’s letter to Cholnoky and his production of the ‘Carte Rouge’ suggest an awareness among individual geographers of the effects of Trianon in advance of the treaty’s formal ratification. Hungarian geographers’ reactions in general to Trianon stressed several themes. Key amongst them was the disruption to Hungary’s long-standing ‘natural geography’ – that, before Trianon, the Carpathian Mountains provided a natural defensive border, the Great Plain a core region, river systems, minerals, and forestry all disposed by nature and a beneficent (Christian) God.

The complex geographical argumentation for the defence of Hungary’s territorial integrity was laid down in ‘The Manifesto of the Hungarian Geographical Society to Geographical Societies of the World’, which was published in the Hungarian Geographical Bulletin in the last issue of 1918 (MFT, 1918). The detailed analysis was based upon the French géographie humaine approach. Teleki and his associates were aware that the French delegation in particular had to be convinced about the truth of Hungarian geographical concepts. Using a French weapon against them seemed the best strategy to legitimize Hungarian arguments. (Vidal de la Blache was the most cited person in the Manifesto [Krasznai, 2012]). The essay emphasised the geographical unity of the Carpathian Basin as a ‘perfect’ geographical region. It did not deny that the Hungarian Kingdom was linguistically divided, but stressed that it was a country with remarkable physical geographical boundaries: ‘In all morphological, geological or tectonic maps, Hungary is recognisable as a well-defined, circular unity’ (MFT, 1918, p. 292.) The territory of the Hungarian Kingdom was almost identical to the drainage system of the central section of the River Danube: the Manifesto specifically highlighted hydrographic issues and drew attention
to the damaging effects of border demarcation on flood protection. ‘Flood control would be impossible if Hungary was divided [...] according to the division plan of our enemies. Hungary’s Central-Tisza valley’s population and Serbia’s Lower-Tisza valley’s population will need to be warned by the Slovaks (about flooding on the Bodrog and Hernád rivers), by the Ruthenians (about flooding on the Tisza and Latorcza rivers), and by the Romanians (about flooding on the Visó, Szamos and Körös rivers)’ (MFT, 1918, p. 301).

In addition to the physical geographical arguments, the Manifesto attested to a series of human geographical arguments for the protection of Hungary’s borders. For example, it pointed out that the new borders would disrupt the market zones that had been formed over the course of centuries where the mountains and plains met. The natural hinterlands of cities within the market zones would also be divided by the new border. The essay argued that border delimitation would result in the disintegration of the geographical division of labour that had developed over the centuries within the Carpathian Basin since, in an economic geographical sense, the Hungarian Kingdom was a functional unity of interdependent and complementary regions. The mountainous regions (today’s Slovakia, Transcarpathia, and a significant part of Transylvania) required agricultural products, which the central part of the basin, the Hungarian Great Plain, was able to supply. In exchange, mountainous areas supplied firewood, timber, coal, ore, and other raw materials and industrial products to agricultural areas.

This natural geography was consonant with Hungary as a political unit. Simply, Trianon ruptured the association between nature and nation. As geographer Ferenc Fodor put it in 1928 in a different Justice for Hungary work, ‘Economic, political, cultural, and ethnographic conditions were radically upset here after the war. The result is a chaos which we may call a geographical discord’ (Fodor, 1928, p. 329, original emphasis). In support of their case, Teleki, Fodor, and others cited the work of German political geographers Friedrich Ratzel and Karl Haushofer, French geographer Élisée Reclus as we have seen, and, on boundaries, British surveyor Thomas Holdich. Apponyi cited Reclus in his January 1920 speech, the Frenchman having declared Hungary ‘to possess a geographical unity unrivalled in Europe. ... Historic Hungary ... forms a natural geographic and economic unit such as stands alone in Europe’ (Deák, 1942, p. 546). To Apponyi, this geographical discord was ethnic and racial. Re-drawing Europe’s borders through such treaties, Trianon included, was at odds with one of US President Wilson’s 14 Point Manifesto informing the peace negotiations, that national unity should be arrived at through self-determination where possible (Tooze, 2014, pp. 119–123). Post-Trianon, natural Hungary was broken, the legacy of an unthinking European geo-politics shaped by Americans. ‘They have’, stressed Fodor, ‘forcibly destroyed the cultural work of a thousand years’ (Fodor, 1928, p. 351, original emphasis).

This background is important to understanding not just how Hungarian geographers felt but how Europe looked to Newbigin, Ogilvie and others, and to explanation of the work of Britain’s geographical representatives in Paris and in London. The British GSGS group would participate in the peace negotiations at a time when Hungary’s ‘dismembered’ geography, of enormous concern to her inhabitants, was a low order priority to Europe’s peacemakers. Hungary’s geographers could see the effect upon their nation even before the war’s end, and, before and after Trianon, sought justice for Hungary in appeals to the international community. How, then, did British geographers react to Trianon? How did Ogilvie and his colleagues undertake their geographical work?
Aftermath and Boundary Settlement: Newbigin and Ogilvie reflect upon the new Europe

In contrast to her Hungarian contemporaries, for Marion Newbigin the peace treaties that ended WWI did ‘not establish a new world’. ‘On the contrary’, she argued, ‘it is itself but an expression of the conflicting forces at work in the old one’ (Newbigin, 1920, p. 14). Her book begins with an admission of complexity: ‘The changes of frontier, and thus of territory, due to the Peace Treaty are so numerous and so complicated’ [as to make] ‘a purely geographical classification useless’ (Newbigin, 1920, p. 5). In a work in ten chapters, the ‘dismemberment of Hungary’ together with analysis of Czechoslovakia is the subject of chapter 5.

Aftermath is largely a work of national political synthesis, each nation being considered in terms of its new borders. In the absence of citations to others’ work or notes to original sources, the research basis to Aftermath is unclear. Newbigin had earlier published on the Balkans (Newbigin, 1915a, 1915b) and, in 1918, wrote anonymously in an editorial capacity on the Armistice (Anon., 1918) (see also below). Hinks and Holdich are mentioned. No reference is made to the work of Hungarian geographers. Newbigin nevertheless understood the association between Hungary’s national bounds and its natural geography and the ethnic delimitation underlying Hungary post-Trianon: ‘if an ordinary map gives rise to the impression that the old kingdom was a natural unit, an ethnographical map shows that this notion is illusory’ (Newbigin, 1920, p. 58). It was illusory not only because physiographic boundaries did not equate to political ones but also because the focus on ethnicity disguised social relationships in which the Hungarians had exerted an unwelcome authority upon other nationalities – ‘to Magyarise them by continuous pressure’ as she put it (Newbigin, 1920, p. 59) – and because Hungary’s delimitation along ethnic grounds was ‘largely dictated by the Western Powers’ in ignorance of these social dimensions. What she called ‘the principle of nationality’ – delimitation along ethnic grounds – was ‘some form of logical basis’ (Newbigin, 1920, p. 88), but dismissal of social hierarchies was imprudent in the longer term.

Aftermath thus offers a description of the new Europe with relatively little depth of enquiry. Her sense was that the reduction of Hungary to, effectively, the Great Plain reflected the concentration of ‘the Magyar people’, and that those lands given up under Trianon were areas in which the Hungarians had exerted undue influence over other ethnicities. This, for Newbigin a social rather than an ethnic question, held dangers for the future: ‘It is indeed far from improbable that, within the confines of the Old Hungary, the economic and social problem will prove to be more fundamental than the racial one, important as this may appear on the surface’ (Newbigin, 1920, p. 63).

In contrast to Newbigin’s, Ogilvie’s Boundary Settlement (1922), written by someone who undertook the work in situ, is dense with detail on the principles and practices by which Europe’s peace-time boundaries were arrived at. Ogilvie’s book is a thirty-two page pamphlet published by the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge and overseen by Harold Temperley. In introduction, Ogilvie noted that the work was ‘intended as an aid in the study of the Treaty of Versailles, St. Germain, Trianon, and Neuilly, and should be read in conjunction with the territorial clauses of those Treaties’ (Ogilvie, 1922, p. iii). This almost certainly is a veiled reference to Temperley’s multi-volume history of the treaties marking the end of WWI (Temperley, 1920). Ogilvie begins in a geographical tone:
The basal conditions underlying the territorial decisions of the Peace Conference may be considered as geographical in a broader and a narrower sense. In seeking to change the political allegiance of a population from one State to another, the Conference arrived first at reducing the ethnic variety in the States, and secondly at finding frontiers which would leave the newly constituted territories with adequate communications, internal and external, which would possess no inherent sources of military irritation, and which would interfere as little as possible with the existing material life of the peoples affected – unless, of course, the alteration were to be for the better on both sides of the line. (Ogilvie, 1922, p. 4)

Furthermore:

At the Peace Conference the term ‘geographical’ was used officially in its narrower sense, which may be held equivalent to ‘topographical’. A Central Geographical Committee was formed whose functions were first to ensure that all boundaries selected were easy to establish and maintain, and that they were properly delimited, and secondly to prepare instructions for the Demarcation Commissions. (Ogilvie, 1922, p. 5)

This suggests certain emphases and structures for the different treaties within the Paris Conference. Ogilvie pointed also to the difficulties of actually implementing these and other statements of principle and at the unequal power relations between the national delegations involved.

The Allied and associated powers wholly avoided discussions of ethnic and geographic questions in replying to comments from the Hungarian delegation (Ogilvie, 1922, p. 7). Most experts would have agreed, Ogilvie observed, to further principles over what a ‘good frontier’ should do: include the maximum number of their own nationals within their borders and a minimum of other nationalities; not disturb existing administrative boundaries; consider local requirements; avoid sharp salients; make use of well-defined natural features; afford the best facilities for economic life and avoid disrupting existing lines of communication.

In Part II of the book, Ogilvie pointed out how application of these principles and basal conditions to ‘the Austrian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian Treaties’ was compromised not just by the facts of geography but particularly what he called ‘la haute politique’ such that ‘principles were stated only in a vague and general fashion’ (Ogilvie, 1922, p. 7). Of the new Czechoslovakia, for example, from Bohemia to Ruthenia the new state presented ‘a gradually narrowing figure corresponding to the outline of the mountain system’. For economic and political as well as strategic reasons, the conference ‘to a large extent, set aside the ethnic line as a boundary’ (Ogilvie, 1922, pp. 12, 14). The search for a boundary between Hungary and Yugoslavia conforming to ethnographical divisions ‘proved to be most difficult’, as it did on the Romanian boundary given ‘the remarkable mosaic of races’ (Ogilvie, 1922, p. 21). On all sides, and it is a point stressed in Part II of Boundary Settlement, Hungary’s ethnic diversity made positioning its new border problematic. No matter which boundary was under review – that with Yugoslavia, or Romania especially, ‘considerable numbers of alien population must necessarily be included’ (Ogilvie, 1922, p. 23). Recognising, for example, that the boundary on the northern plain around Baranya, the Bačka/Bácska and the Banat was a compromise – ‘open to criticism’ as he put it of Hungary’s proposed borders with Romania in general (Ogilvie, 1922, p. 25) – Ogilvie observed that too much consideration was given to rail connections: ‘the railway question manifestly controlled the decision’ (Ogilvie, 1922, p. 26). The motivations for delimiting the new boundaries between Austria and Hungary were ‘firstly ethnic and secondly
economic’ (Ogilvie, 1922, p. 28). Romania’s new borders, meantime, with ethnic factors to the fore, were re-cast by French geographer Emmanuel de Martonne (Palsky, 2002).

In sum, statements in principle were compromised by geographical circumstances and might be compromised further by the different bases upon which boundaries could be decided: ethnicity (principally), physiography, and lines of communication. Hungary’s Trianon borders did not reflect the basal conditions identified for the Conference – nor, for Ogilvie (or for Newbigin), did they properly adhere to Wilson’s principle of national self-determination. They did not, in part, given differences within the American delegation as to how that delegation was to work and what role was to be played by ethnic mapping (Gelfand, 1963; Lansing, 1921). They did not – because they could not – reflect the country’s ethnic diversity, or its physiography (a view articulated by Fodor amongst Hungarian geographers). For the Americans in particular, Hungary was never going to be the same given an Austro-Hungarian Empire which ‘had fallen to pieces’ (Lansing, 1921, p. 224): reflecting upon the issue, Bowman simply stated ‘The new Hungary is indeed a problem’ (Bowman, 1922, p. 218). Given their joint involvement and the timing of their reflections upon geography, peace work, mapping the new Europe, it would be instructive to compare Ogilvie’s, 1922 work on the new Europe he helped delineate with Bowman’s contemporaneous view of the new world order (Bowman, 1922). Here, however, our concern is with Ogilvie’s work and competing views within Britain’s geographical community.

The work of peace: Alan Ogilvie and Britain’s geographers in Paris and in London

Reporting in April 1920 upon ‘Geography at the Congress [sic] of Paris’, Arthur Hinks began by noting ‘When history comes to deal with the peace settlement it may well study how far the precepts of geography were followed by the Congress of Paris. It will be well, therefore, to note now the extent to which geographical opinion was at the disposal of the Allied and Associated Powers both in preparation for the Congress and throughout its deliberations’ (Anon., 1920, p. 309).

In Paris, in Hinks’ view, decisions on the territorial changes involved four main processes. The first was ‘the decision as to the larger political divisions of the future; secondly the search for the best kind of frontier in each case; thirdly the definition and delimitation of the new boundaries; and lastly the provision of boundary commissions for the demarcation on the ground’. Although each was ‘geographical to a greater or lesser extent’ – the first in particular was ‘the affair of geography in its widest sense’ – Hinks doubted ‘if the opinion of geographers had any great weight in the decisions of the first magnitude’ (Anon., 1920, p. 310). He was similarly doubtful over their involvement in the third and fourth processes. By contrast, the second process – ‘the choice of the best frontier’ – required ‘geographical knowledge of several kinds’. This included the ability ‘to appraise the relative value of large-scale maps’ [and] ‘knowledge of the kind of boundary which would be easily fixed in a permanent manner on the ground, and... the ability to choose lines which would interfere as little as possible with the economic life of the various districts’ (Anon., 1920, p. 310). Despite work by the intelligence sections of several British government departments, Hinks was circumspect over the geographical
work done before Paris: ‘it is doubtful if the British delegation as a whole obtained full value for the labour expended before the armistice’ (Anon., 1920, p. 310).

Hinks’ separation of the geographical work done in Paris from that undertaken before the Peace Conference gets ‘behind’ the descriptions of Newbigin and of Ogilvie but not fully. British geographers’ peace work involved moving between Paris and the RGS, as well as boundary work in Paris. In addition to his wife, Ogilvie was the most mobile, the London-based Hedley the most sedentary (we know little of Major Wynne, nothing of Captain Parker, Ogilvie’s replacement from August 1919). Ogilvie’s work is also explicable in relation to his prior experiences. By 1919, Ogilvie’s involvement in boundary work, in Paris and in London, and in liaising between delegations would expose him to inadequacies in British geography. British geographers had recognised not only the difficulty of mapping ethnicity in the Hungarian context but also what they considered Hungarians’ unwarranted dominance of other ethnicities some years before. Nor was all boundary work the same.

**British geographical interests in Hungary before Trianon**

British geographers recognised the problems presented by mapping nationalities in Hungary several years before Teleki and colleagues produced the ‘Carte Rouge’ and before the war ended. Evidence for this comes from a paper read before the RGS in November 1915. At Hinks’ suggestion, geography teacher B. C. Wallis presented work on questions of Hungary’s mapping that had arisen during the compilation of the 1:1 million map of Europe underway in the RGS. Wallis was an advocate of statistical teaching and illustration within geography and cartography (Wallis, 1911). As Wallis stated, and Hinks came to realise, ‘Hungary probably presents the greatest difficulty to the mapmaker since there are no less than seven different nationalities under Hungarian rule’ (Wallis, 1916, p. 177). Wallis’s paper was, in one sense, an exercise in comparative cartography. Using 1910 census data (as would Teleki), Wallis produced different map types – by density, area, line, isopleth, choropleth, and so on – to demonstrate the complexity of mapping nationalities based upon language use. In a more significant sense, what mattered was the message to which his maps led him. His interpretation of them was of the dominance of ‘the Magyars’ [Hungarians] and their suppression of other ethno-linguistic groups: ‘Magyar culture is not propagated peacefully’ (Wallis, 1916, p. 185).

In the discussion that followed, Wallis’s innovative cartography was welcomed despite the author’s admission that it was work in progress (he had, in Hinks’ presence, already spoken on this work to the 1915 BAAS meeting). Discussants included Britain’s leading economic geographer, Lionel Lyde of University College London. Lyde knew Wallis, shared his interests in statistics in his own university teaching, but disagreed with Wallis’s positioning of boundaries on ethnic grounds: ‘I believe that a river is the right political frontier and that you should have the frontier on the river’ (Lyde et al., 1916, p. 188). Lyde’s view – that physical, and not human geographical features, should be the basis to borders – was consistent with his earlier work on military geography (Lyde & Mockler-Ferryman, 1905), and with his recognition of the importance of geography and mapping in times of war (Holdich & Lyde, 1915: cf. Belloc, 1915). It was consistent, too, with his views on boundaries in a future Europe (Lyde, 1915). As he wrote in Some Frontiers of To-morrow, ‘the key to all the rest really lies with Hungary, where the physical
basis is really simple, but the political issues are momentous’ (Lyde, 1915, p. 82). This view on natural borders was shared with Britain’s pre-eminent exponent of boundary mapping.

Thomas Holdich spent his working life mapping political boundaries on natural bases – in Afghanistan, the Pamirs, Baluchistan, the Andean Cordillera – and, in retirement, writing about them in times of war. Holdich’s *Political Frontiers and Boundary Making* (1916) reflects this lifetime’s achievement. Like others, Holdich was looking at a Europe then at war and to a future peace. To Holdich, there were two essential conditions of an international ‘scientific frontier’: ‘that it should be a barrier in the first place, and that the position of that barrier should be selected with due reference to the will of the people chiefly concerned in the second’ (Holdich, 1916, p. 286). Barriers to Holdich meant physical features, mountain ranges or topography that afforded what he called ‘command’: ‘Command, in these days of artillery dominance, is, indeed, all important’ (Holdich, 1916, p. 288) as it was in an age before air power changed warfare forever. On these terms, there were ‘few scientific frontiers in Europe’ (Holdich, 1916, p. 286). Presciently, Holdich gazed eastwards in looking to the future: ‘It is in Central Europe that the great difficulties of readjustment will arise; the origin of those difficulties being based on the intermixture of nationalities which refuse to assimilate, … . This intermixture again is chiefly due to the geographical conformation of a vast area of country which presents no natural features which might serve as a physical obstacle to mutual trespass’ (Holdich, 1916, p. 293). Poland presented ‘the greatest complexity’ – ‘a sort of cockpit for Central Europe, a convenient centre for the settlement of disputes’ (Holdich, 1916, p. 295). Hungary did not merit concern: ‘Hungary is a State which calls for little sympathy both as an enemy in the present war and as a tyrant over smaller nationalities in times of peace’ (Holdich, 1916, p. 302).

Within the RGS, different views were held over what boundary work was. Holdich’s life-long emphasis upon mountain ranges and military ‘command’ – for Hungary, one obvious border was the Carpathians – and his attitude toward that country’s future boundaries as being difficult to effect in terms of ethnicity was one view. In later work, written as the war was ending and from his position as RGS President, Holdich dismissed the idea of a natural-national Hungary – ‘wherever the dividing line may be drawn, there is no prospect of basing it on strong national features’ (Holdich, 1918, p. 118). Lyde held to natural boundaries, chiefly to rivers, but less strongly than Holdich. Wallis and Hinks held to a yet different view, that of ethnic delimitations. In peace work in Paris, this was the view and practice that predominated.

**Drawing boundaries in war and peace: Alan Ogilvie at work in Paris and London**

Alan Ogilvie and Walter Coote Hedley knew one another before they worked together in Paris and London. They met following Ogilvie’s presentation to the RGS in July 1914 on the cartographic needs of physical geography (Ogilvie, 1915). Hedley was head of GSGS; Ogilvie, then a demonstrator in geography at Oxford, was completing a research degree on the physical geography of the coasts of the Moray Firth (Withers, 2010b). Ogilvie’s 1915 paper is more important here than its content might suppose. In stressing the value of maps, to physical geography especially and to scientific geography generally, Ogilvie observed that physiography was hampered by the limited availability of maps of different scales, their price, and by limited coordination between Britain’s map-making institutions. While Ogilvie’s remarks upon physiography hint at an affinity with the
landform analyses of William Morris Davis – perhaps gleaned during the 1912 Transcontinental Excursion – his criticism of existing map provision, chiefly of the Ordnance Survey, is the more important point. In discussion, both Holdich and Hedley admitted that the Ordnance Survey, the GSGS and geographical societies such as the RGS, should do more to produce maps appropriate to different needs (Holdich et al., 1915).

Hedley first contacted Ogilvie over work for the GSGS in July 1915, Ogilvie noting the fact in his diary: ‘By appointment saw Col. W. C. Hedley RE at War Office – asked me to go to N’. East as map compiler. Agreed’ (Ogilvie, Diaries, 9 July 1915). Ogilvie was by then in France as an officer in the 7th London Brigade of the Field Artillery. Ogilvie was more forthcoming (and self-deprecating) regarding his prospective map work in writing to his immediate superior in the Intelligence Corps, Major Dunnington Jefferson: ‘He [Hedley] is anxious to send me to the Near East to do a kind of map compilation for which I gather that he thinks I am specially suited’ (Ogilvie Papers, Ogilvie, A. G., n.d., but ca. July 1915). In fact, Ogilvie had applied for intelligence work on 30 May 1915 given his geographical qualifications, his ability in French and German (Ogilvie had studied in Paris and in Berlin before the war), and the no-doubt crucial fact that ‘I can ride a motor cycle; but have never repaired one’ (Ogilvie Papers, Ogilvie, A., ca. July 1915). This evidence affirms the Near East focus of the GSGS and the RGS at that time (Heffernan, 1996) and adds new details given Ogilvie’s hitherto-undisclosed agency in application to the GSGS.

Ogilvie never got to the Near East. Changed orders directed him to Salonika and the Maps and Survey Section of the General Staff (Salonica) Expeditionary Force. This work, over-looked in studies of Ogilvie (Withers, 2010b), has a direct bearing on Ogilvie’s later endeavours in Paris and upon his 1922 book. The work of the Maps and Survey Section in Salonika was in four subsections: field surveys, compilation of maps from field surveys, ‘reproduction of maps for the use of troops’, and map issue. Ogilvie was in charge of the reproduction section (located in a disused café near to Army Headquarters). The work involved map colouring, tracing boundary lines and overseeing print runs of between 500 and 2,300 maps a day, depending on the number of colours used. The British printing equipment – ‘45 years old and [which] required constant repair and much trouble to maintain register’ – was better than that available to Britain’s allies: Ogilvie’s section assisted the French and the topographical section of the Serbian Army in its map work (Report on the Work of the Printing Section, R.E. from January to December 1916, Ogilvie papers). In January 1917, the four branches were merged, giving Ogilvie experience in other areas of map work. On leave in February 1917, Ogilvie was instructed to travel via Rome to take advantage of Italian expertise in aerial photography and map making. By the time that Hedley directed his formal transfer to GSGS in March 1918, it is arguable that no one in British geographical circles rivalled Ogilvie’s academic understanding of the power of maps and his practical experience of what map making, boundary work, and map printing involved.

Ogilvie’s expertise was in demand within days of the 11 November 1918 Armistice. A planned paper to the RGS on Macedonia, he advised Hinks, would have to be postponed, since ‘it is possible though by no means certain that I shall be required abroad during Peace negotiations [sic]’ (Ogilvie, Diaries, 13 November 1918). On 6 February 1919, Ogilvie and Hedley attended the first meeting of the ‘Conference of Geographical Representatives of Delegations of Great Powers + Belgium’ at which meeting ‘Resolutions [were] drawn up provisionally for presenting to P[eace]. C[onference]. Sec’y use of 1/M map for...
Definitions & other maps to be settled on by geog. experts’ (Ogilvie, Diaries, 6 February 1919). This was the ‘Central Geographical Committee’ referred to in Boundary Settlement (Ogilvie, 1922, p. 6). That same day he wrote to Hinks: ‘The work here is coming in thick and fast, which by the grace of God will mean that the Peace Congress will be short & sweet’ (Ogilvie, A., Diaries, 6 February 1919). The work would in fact prove so voluminous and complicated (as he made clear in retrospect in 1922) that after securing Hedley and Hinks’ permission he directed his wife, Evelyn, to use the RGS’s library to access geographical information which she then forwarded to him in Paris. This also involved speaking with Hinks, attending lectures, and meeting with Holdich and Keltie (whom she knew from Oxford) (Ogilvie, Diaries, 26 February 1919, 27 March 1919, 8 May 1919, 29 May 1919). She later travelled to Paris to help Ogilvie.

Alan Ogilvie’s diaries from early February 1919 are full of terse entries on his work: ‘coached H. Nicolson’ [Harold Nicolson, member of the British delegation] ‘on Albanian Greek frontier’ (13 February 1919); ‘Planned new map of Poland’ (14 February 1919); ‘drew frontiers for Albania & Serbia Bulgaria’ (19 February 1919); ‘Drew strategic frontier on Greece – Bulgaria in Thrace to agree as nearly as possible with ethnography. Submitted to Harold Nicholson’ (21 February 1919). The work continued unabated: ‘Tues. 4 [March] All day on frontiers’. His first mention of Hungary is 6 March 1919 in which, at a meeting with Johnson, de Martonne and an Italian diplomat, the business was ‘frontier of Cz. Slov. & Roumanians & Magyars’. The following evening, Ogilvie called on Cvijić of the Yugo-slav delegation. On Sunday 16 March 1919, Ogilvie lunched with others in a ‘reunion of the 1912 Excursion’, including De Martonne, Gallois, Demangeon, Brunhes, Bowman, and Johnson. Into April, Ogilvie worked on the ‘Jugo-Slav. Frontier’ (3 April, 1919), ‘S. Poland for meandering river frontiers’ (7 April, 1919), and, on 15 May 1919, ‘all day office on the Hungary & Galician armistice’ (Ogilvie, A., Diaries, dates as given).

While this illustrates the nature and intensity of the work, and the day-to-day activities hinted at in his Boundary Settlement, two further points are salient. Busy as he was in Paris, Ogilvie found time to pursue his own research. This, initially, was glaciological work, which he had begun in 1912 and would discuss in Paris with French geographer Pierre Rabot. Principally, it was research on Macedonia that certainly stemmed from his Salonika work and from boundary mapping in Paris. Ogilvie presented his delayed work on Macedonia to the RGS on 24 March 1919 during a period of leave: it appeared the following year (Ogilvie, 1920). At Bowman’s insistence, a related paper appeared in an American journal (Ogilvie, 1921). In May 1919, Ogilvie apologised to Hinks over delays in this other work, ‘although I can honestly plant some of the guilt on the draughtsmen of the Treaties whose slave I am at present’ (Ogilvie, A., Diaries, 22 May 1919). By then, he was working with Harold Temperley, as well as with Hedley and Nicolson. In his diary entry for 24 May 1919, Temperley – who had spent the afternoon in dispute with the Italian delegation over which mountain peaks might form points on their borders – records instructing Ogilvie ‘to do his best to keep them on the crests of hills and not to give offensive military advantage to them [the Italians]’ (Temperley, 1920, p. 427). This suggests a Holdich-like attention to physical geography and ‘command’ in boundary work, at least from the Italians. Temperley’s six-volume History of the Peace Conference lists Ogilvie’s work more fully. Ogilvie was responsible for the four sketch maps in volume I, the seven in volume II, and what Temperley called ‘the geographical direction of volumes I-III’ (Temperley, 1920, II, p. v). This work, under Temperley’s
direction, explains why Temperley called upon Ogilvie to present his war work for publication as *Boundary Settlement*, a fact Ogilvie acknowledged in the preface (Ogilvie, 1922, iii).

Intense as they were, the Paris peace negotiations were strongly social, a fact some contemporaries found disquieting after the ravages of war (Macmillan, 2001, pp. 157–161). As Temperley noted, ‘At meals, and when off duty, there was no convention to forbid discussion of the business in hand. A unique opportunity was thus given to every specialist of grasping the relation of his own particular question to all the others involved, and of seeing its place in the vast problem of reconstruction before the Congress’ (Temperley, 1920, I, p. vi). On occasion, Ogilvie dined with Lawrence of Arabia (‘Talk with T. E. Lawrence re Syria & claims’, 18 February 1919: they met again, at the RGS, in March 1919). His dinner companions, when not Temperley and Nicolson, were more usually geographers from other delegations: de Margerie, Bowman, Johnson. Evelyn Ogilvie recalled a dinner with Temperley – ‘who regaled us with gossip’ (Ogilvie, Diaries, 16 June 1919). On 29 May 1919, Ogilvie recorded his day’s work in his diary: ‘Long day on Treaty. Afternoon at Quai d’Orsay. Final definition of S. Frontier of Austria and Basin of Klagenfurt as for plebescite [sic] – settled by the ‘4’ this morning [Woodrow Wilson, Lloyd George, Georges Clemenceau, Vittorio Orlando (Italian Premier)]. At this meeting of the Central Territorial Committee it was clear that owing to absence of ministers at the meeting of the ‘4’ there was divergence of view as to what decision was. Dined with M. & Mdm Cvijic – Gallois, de Margerie & Johnson there. Afterwards discussed possibility of founding in future an international geog. Journal or annual for large works – like Petermanns supplements’ (Ogilvie, Diaries, 29 May 1919).

The Paris Peace Conference allowed geographers of different nations to demonstrate their proficiencies in re-drawing Europe’s boundaries and along different lines, principally ethnic but also physiographic – de Martonne for Romania, Romer for Poland, Cvijíc for Yugoslavia, and Ogilvie with others for Britain and Europe more generally (Ginsburger, 2016; Labbé, 2018; Palsky, 2002). We should see their work as a compromise between different principles, with ethnic considerations to the fore. Ogilvie’s *Boundary Settlement* makes this clear. Even Bowman admitted to the limited quality of some map work. Congratulating Ogilvie on his Manchester appointment in a letter of September 1919, Bowman noted how he was sending on ‘a set of base maps and block diagrams which were prepared here [the AGS] for the use of the Peace Conference. In using them be sure to remember that they were prepared under great pressure, in large part by inexpert draftsmen, and that they have many defects’ (Bowman to Ogilvie, American Geographical Society Archive, 18 September 1919). The Paris conference also afforded opportunities for international exchange over the nature of geography at a time when the subject, in Britain and in America, was in formation (Dunbar, 2001; Martin, 2015). At the same time, and as he worked alongside Bowman, Johnson, de Margerie and others in delimiting Europe’s future geographies, Alan Ogilvie came to see inadequacies in Britain’s geographical capacities in the present.

**Institutional differences, personal opportunities**

On 2 April 1919, after a ‘quiet day’ walking in the Bois de Boulogne, Ogilvie wrote to Hinks in a letter marked ‘Private’. In part, the letter was about Ogilvie’s uncertainty over applying for the post of reader in geography at Oxford, news of which vacancy
had come from Henry Dickson, geographer, meteorologist, and, in WWI, head of the Geographical Section of the Admiralty’s Naval Intelligence division. Ogilvie’s expressed anxiety over this matter centred upon a possible slight to his friend H. O. Beckit in Oxford were Ogilvie to apply and be successful (Beckit did get the post). But this was a preface to his real intent in writing:

You will recall the conversation which we had on the subject of Geography in the direct service of the Government. I daily become more impressed with the need for some such organization which will serve all government departments. I hope that Lord Curzon and Amery are now putting a scheme to the Cabinet, and I imagine that the R.G.S will be asked officially for its views. It is quite obvious that the cooperation of the Society is necessary in some form or another and it is also quite clear that one or more geographers will have to be found directly the scheme is approved. Moreover the geographers – or at least one of them – will have to have the capacity of bringing the organisation into touch with the actual work of govt. depts. and he will want plenty of tact in so doing. I have recently reviewed the field in my own mind, and frankly – without wishing in the first instance to come to this conclusion – I have become faced with the realization that none is better qualified for this work than I am myself. … I cannot get away from the fact that my years work in London and here has given me very considerable insight into the needs of the various departments of State & their present tendencies. (RGS-IBG Archives, CB8, Ogilvie to Hinks, 2 April 1919)

Quite when Ogilvie’s conversation with Hinks took place is unclear. Hinks and Hedley were corresponding about it in early January 1919. Hinks outlined the possibility of a ‘proposed new Geographical Department’ as ‘a Memorandum on my own responsibility’. In being written at Christmas, however, Hinks considered this could have ‘no opportunity of consultation with the President and the Council of the RGS’ (RGS-IBG Archives, CB8, Hinks to Hedley, 8 January 1919). In the memorandum in question, an anonymous undated typescript entitled ‘The Need for Pooling the Geographical Information at the Disposal of the Government’, the deficiencies of British geographical work, in war and peace, are made clear.

The GSGS had done admirably in the war, but the OS had not ‘the same experience of general geographical work’. The geographical sections of British intelligence had drawn heavily upon the RGS. There has been ‘much overlapping and waste of effort in the attempts made by several newly created departments to supply the geographical handbooks and memoranda required by the Government in the conduct of the war and in the preparation of peace’. The RGS, on the other hand, was the natural home for Britain’s geographical coordination: ‘A Government Bureau of Geography attached to the Society would be a natural development of the services which the Society has always in the past, and especially during the last four years of war, been willing and able to render to the nation’ (RGS-IBG Archives, CB8, Hinks’ papers). The universities and the scientific societies should also be involved in this new body. These ideas and reflections were clearly Ogilvie’s and rooted in his experiences. Responsibility for their transmission to higher authorities lay with Hinks: for reasons to do with the aftermath of a hard-won war and the time of year [Christmas 1918], they were not acted upon.

This is not a digression from Trianon, Paris, and the work of boundary mapping. Ogilvie’s activities as the leading British geographer in the peace negotiations, together with his prior experience, afforded him insight, as no other individual, into the capacity of British geography to work with and for Government. The RGS coordinated the 1:1 million
mapping project for the British. In Paris and in London, mapping Hungary was a departure from this and was work in progress. In London since 1915, the work of Wallis, Lyde, and Holdich was an exercise in comparative cartography set against competing views over the nature of political boundaries. In Paris since 1919, mapping Hungary’s revised borders was part of the geography of European peace.

Ogilvie’s letter to Hinks signals, of course, to personal ambition as much as disquiet over the geographical capacities of different government departments. Hinks’ letter to Hedley and his memorandum following Ogilvie’s promptings suggests that, as Europe’s boundaries were being re-drawn – Hungary last and most extremely of all – there was no shared view from within British geography over that work, over the nature of boundaries, or institutional coordination over map provision.

This claim has earlier support in Ogilvie’s remarks about maps and British geographical coordination in his 1915 paper. Differences of view were certainly apparent in British geography. Britain’s leading geo-politician, Halford Mackinder, considered geography an important aid to statecraft (Mackinder, 1919; see also Parker, 1982), yet he was not involved in the practical questions of boundary work after 1918 (Kearns, 2009), this being the preserve of Hinks, Lyde and Holdich in the RGS, and, in Paris, of Ogilvie and Hedley for the British and Bowman for the Americans and the AGS. Hinks’ authoritative management of the RGS, and his editorial oversight of the society’s *Geographical Journal*, did not endear him to contemporaries. As Heffernan notes, Hinks was taken aback by Bowman’s repeated requests for the RGS’s 1:1 million maps and GSGS war maps: their relationship quickly deteriorated ‘into a mutual loathing as intense as it was long-lasting’ (Heffernan, 1996, p. 521). An astronomer by training with a predisposition to accuracy and precision, Hinks did not take to the ‘modern’ thematic human geography emerging in this period (Withers, Finnegan, & Higgitt, 2006). As late as 1930, Bowman wrote to Ogilvie of Hinks’ continued disfavour: ‘By the way you will be interested to hear that a number of geographers here have made a combined assault upon the R.G.S. on the character of the Geographical Journal. Outwardly at least we have had an overwhelming victory. But I think old Hinks is quite unrepentant + time alone will show whether the Journal turns over a new leaf’. (American Geographical Society Archives and Library, Bowman to Ogilvie, 25 January 1930). Given Hinks’ control of the *Geographical Journal*, his antipathy toward Bowman and the American delegation, his long-standing defence of the RGS as a centre of geographical authority despite leading individuals’ indecision over boundary work, British geographers with interests in the new Europe looked elsewhere for space to examine Hungary’s diminished place in the new Europe.

**British geographers debate the Hungary question, c.1915–c.1922**

The annual meetings of section E, Geography, of the BAAS were vital settings for the development and public promotion of geography, in the early twentieth century in particular. The RGS had close connections with government circles, evening lectures, and had supported the establishment of teaching departments in several British universities, but was in something of an ‘academic crisis’ in the early twentieth century (Withers, 2010a, pp. 198–231). It was slow to have a research committee and, in the opinion of many early professional practitioners, neglected human geography in favour of papers on exploration and did so in part because of Hinks’ authoritarian control of the
Geographical Journal and personal disdain for human geographical research – hence Bowman’s comments to Ogilvie in 1930. Even by the early 1930s, there was still evidence, as its then president put it, that the RGS ‘was inclined to neglect the human and educational aspects of geography’ (Withers, 2010a, p. 223). In contrast, contemporaries recognised the research emphases of the Scottish Geographical Magazine under Newbigin’s editorship, and the meetings of the BAAS as a forum for debate.

Hungary discussed at the BAAS

Both Hinks and Wallis spoke at the 1915 BAAS meeting in Manchester, the former presenting work on the 1:1 million map in the RGS, the latter his comparative maps on the difficulties of portraying racial distribution, using the Budapest sheet of the 1:1 million map as exemplar (McF [McFarlane], 1915, p. 375). In his published presidential address to section E (war work prevented its verbal delivery), H. G. Lyons emphasised the need for research in geography and ‘the advancement of scientific geography’ (Lyons, 1915, p. 269). The war hampered BAAS activities not just Lyons’. Attendance in Manchester was low: Hinks described it as a ‘rather curious, half-alive sort of meeting’ but pronounced himself ‘glad to be there as I made the acquaintance of Miss Newbigin’ (RGS-IBG Archives, Hinks to Keltie, CB8, 10 September 1915). Attendance was lower still in Newcastle in 1916: there were no annual meetings in 1917 and 1918 (Withers, 2010a, p. 49). Hungary and the new Europe were of renewed interest only in the aftermath of WWI.

Marion Newbigin’s paper on the geographical significance of the November 1918 Armistice, published within weeks of the war’s end, has the hallmarks of a provisional piece (Anon., 1918, although unattributed, this is by Newbigin). She recognised that publication of ‘detailed maps showing the armistice conditions is not meantime possible’ (Newbigin, 1918, p. 441). Proposals for the ‘evacuation of Austro-Hungarian territories to a line which is specified in much detail’ (Newbigin, 1918, p. 443) suggest that Newbigin was privy to information not yet in the public domain. But given the dates noted above by Ogilvie on his and others’ work in Paris (February to May 1919), this is unlikely. More probably this reflected Newbigin’s existing knowledge of east central Europe (Newbigin, 1915a, 1915b), hearing Hinks and Wallis in Manchester, and her understanding of the difficulties of mapping race and nationality (Newbigin, 1917). There is no evidence to suggest that she met with Ogilvie to discuss Europe’s boundary mapping. They did meet at the 1922 BAAS meeting in Hull when Newbigin, then section E president, spoke on the ‘new’ human geography: (Newbigin, 1922a, 1922b, 1923). Lyde, McFarlane, and Rudmose Brown were also amongst those in Hull with whom Ogilvie ‘met & talked’ (Ogilvie, Diaries, 22 September 1922).

Newbigin turned to the political geography of the new Europe at the first post-war BAAS meeting, in Bournemouth in 1919, speaking on aspects of nationality and the new internationalism (Newbigin, 1921). Her theme was echoed by section E’s president, Lionel Lyde, on a topic long of interest to him – rivers as national and international boundaries. Acknowledging that ‘this subject was chosen before the publication of the Treaty of Peace’, Lyde stressed that it was ‘dictated by a wish to combine my geographical creed with the political geographies of an ‘Americanised’ Europe’ (Lyde, 1921, p. 212). Reminding his audience how ‘In recent years I have pleaded for the use of rivers as political boundaries’ (Lyde, 1921, p. 213), Lyde sought not to undermine the ethnic basis to
boundary mapping that underlay Trianon and the new Europe, but to endorse an ethic of post-war internationalism – ‘to preserve the valuable variety of political and cultured units, but to draw the various units together. Our object is unity, not uniformity’ (Lyde, 1921, p. 213). Lyde’s address may be read as an unsuccessful appeal to a particular sort of boundary mapping, one not used by those geographers in Europe engaged in the peace negotiations (or shared by Holdich, his British counterpart). We should not lose sight, however, of his internationalist intentions or of the fact that, like Newbigin, Lyons and others, Lyde spoke at a time when human geography was itself determining its content and reach, its own epistemic boundaries. This is as true of Poland, Yugoslavia, and Romania as it is of Britain and the United States.

John McFarlane likewise turned to the new post-war Europe in his address as president of section E on 24 August 1920 to the BAAS meeting in Cardiff (McFarlane, 1920). While we cannot prove direct connections between Newbigin and Ogilvie before 1922 sufficient to suggest that Newbigin drew upon Ogilvie’s Paris experiences for her 1918 paper and 1920 book, McFarlane certainly heard Ogilvie speak upon the issue. Ogilvie stood down from his Paris peace work in June 1919 to join the University of Manchester. During his brief tenure of the lectureship in geography there, Ogilvie addressed an ‘audience of about 40’ at the Manchester Geographical Society, on 5 November 1919, on ‘Geography at [the] Peace Conference’ (Ogilvie, Diaries, 5 November 1919). It is impossible to know whether McFarlane drew from Ogilvie’s 1919 speech for his Cardiff lecture and paper, or upon Newbigin’s, 1920 work, but the cumulative evidence of presidential BAAS addresses, published papers and public speeches nonetheless indicates the strength of interest in post-War Europe, Hungary included.

McFarlane’s argument was clear: ‘In the rearrangement of European States which has taken place, geographical conditions have perhaps not had the consideration which they deserve’ (McFarlane, 1920, p. 217). These conditions were not those advocated by Holdich – natural ‘defensive frontiers’ (McFarlane, 1920, p. 218) – but, rather, the principle of self-determination: a central tenet of Wilson’s plan for the new Europe (Bowman, 1922; Macmillan, 2001; Seegel, 2018; Tooze, 2014). In McFarlane’s view, these were overlooked in the final boundary mapping on ethnic grounds. Because this principle had been unevenly applied rather than wholly ignored, argued McFarlane, ‘we shall, I think, find that the promise of stability is greatest in those cases where geographical and ethnical conditions are most in harmony, and least where undue weight has been given to conditions which are neither geographical nor ethnical’ (McFarlane, 1920, p. 218). Poland was now ‘geographically weak’; Czechoslovakia ‘in various ways the most interesting country in the reconstructed Europe’ (McFarlane, 1920, pp. 221, 224). Hungary – specifically, the effect upon the ‘great natural region’ of the Hungarian plain, and ‘the mountain region which surrounds it’ (McFarlane, 1920, p. 227) – was the subject of particular comment: ‘[I]t is in the treatment of the Hungarian plain that we feel most disposed to criticise the territorial settlements of the Peace Treaties. Geographical principles have been violated by the dismemberment of a region in which the Magyars were in a majority, and in which they were steadily improving their position’. ‘The position as a whole’, McFarlane stressed, ‘is one of unstable equilibrium. ... In this part of Europe at least a League of Nations will not have to seek for its troubles’ (McFarlane, 1920, pp. 227–228).

The views expressed within the BAAS about the ‘dismemberment’ of Hungary and the new post-War Europe in the years immediately following the conflict, both in the wake of
the Armistice (Anon., 1918) and following Trianon (Lyde, 1921; McFarlane, 1920), are consistent with themes identified elsewhere and in earlier years: competing notions of boundary work; recognition of the ethnic basis to Europe’s new boundaries but, importantly, no consistency of agreement on either the accuracy of their positioning or their longer-term consequences. If, as McFarlane observed, ‘A great experiment has been made in the new settlement of Europe’ (McFarlane, 1920, p. 232), it was not one in which he and others felt sanguine about its future success.

**Conclusion**

This paper has shown the central and complex role played by geography and individual geographers in drawing boundaries for a once modern Europe. This study of geographers’ involvement with the 1920 Treaty of Trianon, of geographies made in particular ways (ethnic mapping), and in specific settings (Parisian hotels, the RGS, BAAS meetings), speaks also to matters of wider significance. These include the importance of critical and contextual biographical work in the histories of geographical knowledge (Barnes, 2001). This paper has centred upon Ogilvie’s unpublished work, but others closely involved in drafting the new Europe have left personal and published reflections of their role (Bowman, 1922; Cholnoky, 1942; Lansing, 1921; Nicholson, 1933; Temperley, 1920). The role of powerful individuals and of international connections in helping shape the discipline in the early twentieth century and in different national contexts (Seegel, 2018; Smith, 2003) is also relevant. So is the role of the BAAS in providing space for the articulation of geographical debate in a period of disciplinary formation (Withers, 2010a), and geographers’ involvement as quasi-state-mapping agents in helping re-cast Europe’s borders in the wake of conflict (Bowman, 1922; Dhand, 2018; Seegel, 2018).

The paper has highlighted how boundaries, lines on maps, and the treaties that determine them, can mean different things to different people. To Hungarians and Hungarian geographers, then and now, Hungary’s ‘dismemberment’ following Trianon represented a particular, perhaps extreme, consequence of Europe’s geographers doing the work of peace. Britain’s geographers were centrally involved in this boundary work, Alan Ogilvie most centrally of all. As this paper has shown, his work and that of others, should be understood not as the straightforward working-out of agreed political and geographical principles – ‘basal points’ as Ogilvie put it in 1922 – but of personal connections in Paris and in London and the articulation there of different views as to what a boundary was, and how it should be arrived at.

For Arthur Hinks and for Alan Ogilvie, British geographical expertise during WWI was not helped by the uneven qualities of the several geographical and mapping sections of the British government. British geographers had turned their attention to the complexities of Hungary’s delimitation on ethnic grounds as early as 1915. But where, in London, Wallis and Hinks considered ethnicity the basis to Hungary’s delimitation, as Ogilvie and the GSGS party would on Britain’s behalf in Paris from February 1919, others in the RGS held to different emphases: Lyde to rivers, Holdich to physiography. In London, there was no single British view over how boundaries should be derived or how to delimit Hungary.

In Paris, things were different. The day-to-day work of defining Europe’s borders and reporting to the Central Geographical Committee upon the activities of numerous boundary activities was, ostensibly, rooted in matters of principle: national self-determination and delimitation of the new Europe on ethnic grounds. As Ogilvie made clear in 1922,
and as he directly experienced between February and May 1919, principles were not adhered to, partly because they conflicted one with another (railways and communication and economic circumstances with ethnic divisions, for example) and because the principal delimiting basis, ethnicity on the basis of language, could not be applied uniformly without, in the Hungarian context, leaving large numbers of ethnic Hungarians outside Hungary’s post-Trianon borders. Ogilvie’s work on boundaries did not cease with his leaving the GSBS, as his November 1919 talk in Manchester shows. Evelyn Ogilvie noted that her husband was ‘at work on frontiers’ for Temperley in June 1920, even as they were both settling in to New York (Ogilvie, Diaries, 19 June 1920).

In illuminating geographers doing peace work after WWI, the paper extends Heffernan’s insights into their war work before 1918 and helps explain, given Ogilvie’s observations, the relative weaknesses of British geography and the uneven institutional provision in mapping. Rather, however, than see this as a symptom of the ‘largely amateur status’ of British geography at this time (Heffernan, 1996, p. 521), our research has pointed to more complex circumstances: competing views over boundaries, disagreements over maps, a shortage of maps, and a failure to work to the political principles agreed upon. At a time when members of the RGS subscribed to different views over national borders, the meetings of the BAAS provided a forum for the public presentation of these issues, and, in the work of McFarlane (1920) and Lyde (1921), the chance to speak to pressing concerns about the reconstruction of Europe after 1918. Trianon was dramatic but not unique. As Holdich recognised, whatever the means chosen to delimit the new Europe, things would not be the same again: ‘There is probably not a nationality between Central Europe and Persia which will occupy exactly the same place after the war as it did before’ (Holdich, 1918, p. ix). Bowman expressed similar views: ‘The effects of the Great War are so far-reaching that we shall have henceforth a new world’ (Bowman, 1922, p. 1). Both men were right.

Years after his involvement in Paris, Ogilvie reflected upon boundaries and his boundary work in his inaugural lecture to the University of Edinburgh, admitting that ‘The new frontiers of Europe are clearly far from perfect’ (Ogilvie, 1924, p. 74). ‘We all know’, Ogilvie continued, ‘that these new frontiers were not fixed in the calm atmosphere of peace, but when the political air was still whirling round the deepest storm-centre of history’ (Ogilvie, 1924, p. 74). Yet it was necessary that geography should ‘enter very largely into the business of boundary making’ since, as he saw it, modern geography was both a study and an aid to understanding bigger questions (Ogilvie, 1924, p. 73).

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